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I need some stories, your stories... I'm going to be giving a talk about peer-to-peer mentoring to a group of airlines who all should be starting up advanced mentoring programs. A more advanced mentoring program for upgrading Captains - which is very different from what they may have right now in the mentorship space... and I would like to have some examples to share of successful 'mentoring' other than the myriad of anecdotal stories that I have personally. The why & how showcasing how career-long learning and mentorship works through sharing info.

What is this site, except a giant networking/mentoring group?

We are all the sum total of all of the good & bad experiences we've had in aviation. We all bring that baggage - for lack of a better term - over to the left seat when we upgrade.

Throughout most of the industry's history we've had an apprenticeship model when it comes to minting new Captains. You would have a long career 'climbing the ladder' and you would have a lot of time to learn the trade from a lot of different pilots... different Captains... both good and bad. Think about the 1st half of Fate is the Hunter. How Ernie Gaan was 'mentored' by the Pilots of AA in the 30's. That's how things work in our industry.

Up until recently that is - when the industry was turned around on it's head. Now, things are changing and the legacy training models that worked in the past haven't caught up with the - again for lack of a better term - "skills gap" that is happening. Call it "Children of the Magenta" - call it something else... it's been happening for awhile and accelerated pretty fast over the past few years as retirements and growth have been racing each other.

So, I inherited this very new and unique program and now I have to "sell it." (Well, not really sell it... but talk about how investing in it could be another good defense/chain link against potential accident/incident) I have the "Why" - but the plural of anecdote is not data. I'd like to be able to showcase real-world examples of 'stuff' - dead horses we've beaten, discussions, etc. etc.

Sharing knowledge.

Everyone here that participates in the discussion have had the same experiences as I have - as a member of this community. A community who's mission is to uplift and support one another. We share our stories and we all learn. We debrief each other as we opine about.... stuff. Personally, I have 20+ years of lurking/membership as a data point. I'm trying to find other points.

I'm not going to steal your stories, but I would like to be able to tell your stories as examples of how we are all better because we talk to each other. Mentor each other. I'd also like to be able to shamelessly R&D without having to dig through the archives - examples of really anything. Things you've learned. Things that have happened to you. Stories you've shared before. Stories that people have grabbed ahold of and put in their toolbox. Discussions you remember... Because, that's how we share info here.

I don't know if this will work, if in the next month I can get a good collection together to showcase some peer-to-peer mentoring stuff - or if this thread will die on the vine... but asking for stoiries in my notes as I try to come up with something better than 'death by powerpoint' for this talk.

Please help. Feel free to copy/paste and dig up the past. Or just point me in the right direction of posts from dead threads.

I appreciate it.
 
I dunno if this helps, but I did a 3 day with an FO who didn’t tip the van drivers on the two layovers. Like didn’t even attempt to make excuses or say something.

Grabbed her bags and went into the hotel. It really irked me. We represent the profession and it makes us all look bad. But I was too much of a knob to say something and wish I had. That’s it.

I’m also younger than 95% of the FOs I fly with and I feel like it’s kinda a weird dynamic.

I’m still trying to figure it all out.
 
I think this is a great idea, BUT I'm confused about what you're actually asking for. Could you distill this down into one fairly simple question, maybe something like "As an experienced captain, what advice would you give to a new captain?", OR "What are some of the best things and the worst things that you've learned from other pilots?".

Our recurrent training for the airline used to do a fun exercise in CRM class. Everybody got 10 minutes. First Officers were asked to list all of the qualities they associated with good captains, and Captains were told to list the qualities that they associated with good FO's. This always led to some great discussions, including plenty of stories about things that had happened at work (good and bad).

There's also some good material in the Airline Pilots Forums (the "What is your greatest piece of advice" thread).
 
I've got quite a few.

After reading what you posted this story comes to mind. It's a two part story. But the focus is on remaining patient and being calm to get through to those you mentor. It pays dividends in the long run. This is a bit long so sorry, not sorry.

Flying into BZN with a newer pilot on the 737. I am a brand new captain. Like within a couple of months at this point. The FO is new on the aircraft but his dad is a very senior "Artic Eagle" in Anchorage. It was my first time encountering a new 737 pilot with for lack of a better term "inflated ego".

There was a horizon jumpseater who lived in BZN and the FO was flying. I forget the name but at BZN there is an initial fix that sets you up too high going into BZN from the west. This is apparently getting fixed after biting what I assume is many of our crews as I am sure many other operators. I try to help mentor as much as possible without being overbearing but I wasn't getting through to this particular FO. I made a recommendation about programming a lower altitude at the fix in question than assigned by ATC and then slowing when leveled off. My recommendation was dismissed. I also added a 30 mile ring to cross at 10K but the FO didn't seem to want to use that method for determining energy management.

I kept trying to assist and made a recommendation that we were too fast and too high and should drop the landing gear as soon as possible to make things easier. This FO was having none of it. After what I considered to be my last recommendation to correct our energy state, before mostly focusing on the go around I glanced over to the Horizon jumpseater. He looked very concerned about our energy state but didn't say anything. When we turned final the FO finally realized how pear shaped things had become. I made the decision to let things continue and if we did not meet the stabilized approach criteria we would just go around. Which wouldn't be ideal but was also a non event. We had enough gas and despite the terrain and training issues at my place of employment, a go around is fairly easy.

At this point in the flight the FO became very open to my help and I had a last trick to help fix the energy state. We fixed it and we met the stabilized approach criteria. The landing wasn't great mostly due to all the excitement about being in a poor energy state. Thankfully by remaining patient, calm and having a plan B the FO didn't view me as an adversary. He debriefed the approach and was very critical of himself, while also viewing me as a resource to help. Learning had occurred. My first takeaway from this event is that you can't micromanage bad practices and also get through to certain pilots. You have to let them make mistakes.

I decided to invite the FO to join me for dinner. At dinner I noticed he had gotten a lot of feedback about how young and lucky he was to be in his position from other captains. Early 20s at a legacy a very enviable spot indeed. He seemed very resentful about having to hear about how lucky he was and felt like his struggles were not recognized. I realized this was another opportunity for mentorship.

I chose not to remind him about how my career has basically been a mess of lack of opportunity due to the state of the industry and bad timing. I asked him questions about his background and flying jobs before reaching his current position. Frankly he was extremely lucky and hadn't really paid his dues, which is fine and it isn't my place to be judgmental about it. I decided the best way to get through to this young and fairly brash pilot was to be empathetic. I listened to him. That is one of the most important aspects of mentorship that is also not recognized by most pilots.

I made the remark that we couldn't control when we were born and everyone has a unique path to where they wind up in their career. It wasn't my fault that I was born when I was and I lived through one of the worst times in history to be a pilot, if not the worst. It also wasn't his fault he had one of the best opportunities in the history of being a pilot. That's just how things were. The trick was having empathy for those around you. I reminded him that at some point he would be flying with someone who didn't have the same opportunities as him that eventually he would be a very senior captain at a very young age. He would need to be mindful about how lucky he was and it would be very important to have empathy for those less fortunate that he worked with. I seemed to get through to him much more effectively that berating him about all of my misfortunes and how I had to pay my dues. So that is my second takeaway in regards to mentorship: empathy and listening are extremely important. You can't just berate people who are less experienced than you and expect them to be receptive to what your recommendations are. Even if they are sound recommendations.

I'm a really new captain on the 737. I've never been a 121 captain before just a captain at 135s and 91 operations. With 20 years of observing mostly poor leadership qualities I've learned about what not to do for the most part and from the few above average CRM captains I've have the privilege of flying with I have learned what to do. My job of being a mentor is made more complex by the fact I will fly with someone who is 20 years senior to me one day and extremely junior the next. So I am "being a chameleon" at least as much as I had to as a first officer. My biggest takeaway from my own shop's mentorship program is that the mentors have to be willing to listen, remain calm and be empathetic. As a whole it is entirely missing from our program. This is a massive failure, not on the mentees but the mentors. Our training program is a perfect example of this failure. It remains overly complex and focused on near impossible to duplicate scenarios involving multiple failures when it should be focused on simple day to day events. I think this is largely due to ego becoming involved with a desire to transfer knowledge. Educators and mentors can not let the desire to appear knowledgeable to those they educate get in the way of learning.

This will never change as long as there is a financial and QOL incentive to getting involved with training and will be a major obstacle to chance in a training department and mentorship program. The wrong people will be placed in the training department and mentorship program and there will never be a measurable good outcome.
 
I dunno if this helps, but I did a 3 day with an FO who didn’t tip the van drivers on the two layovers. Like didn’t even attempt to make excuses or say something.

Grabbed her bags and went into the hotel. It really irked me. We represent the profession and it makes us all look bad. But I was too much of a knob to say something and wish I had. That’s it.

I’m also younger than 95% of the FOs I fly with and I feel like it’s kinda a weird dynamic.

I’m still trying to figure it all out.

I cover van tips for the entire crew. It develops a lot of comradery and sets a good example for the FOs on what leadership means. I don't feel that pilots who take advantage of others in the way your FO did can really be helped. Saying something may have led to a good outcome or it may have hurt CRM for the remainder of the trip. Likely they knew they were doing the wrong thing without you saying anything about it.
 
I dunno if this helps, but I did a 3 day with an FO who didn’t tip the van drivers on the two layovers. Like didn’t even attempt to make excuses or say something.
This is a great example of a conversation generator - and I remember a thread about this. That somehow included a discussion about tips for the hotel maids. Thanks... please keep them coming.

I think this is a great idea, BUT I'm confused about what you're actually asking for. Could you distill this down into one fairly simple question, maybe something like "As an experienced captain, what advice would you give to a new captain?", OR "What are some of the best things and the worst things that you've learned from other pilots?".

Those are great questions... and yeah. That kind of thing is exactly what I'm looking for. Sort of... I'm also looking for conversation topics. Stuff that you would want to talk about with a new captain. Things to facilitate discussion to do some of that classic Socratic method stuff. Jeopardy-style... How about "Advice and stories that ask questions so that you can have discussions with new Captains to get them thinking about stuff they might not have experienced or thought about before."
 
I have to say, to @BEEF SUPREME ’s point, I have seen a remarkable difference in newhires of late.

And not the good way.


At the gate, a new FO used the display switching panel to go from ‘norm’ to ‘both on right’ in order to send the Baro accel height from FO side to mine. I’ve never seen someone do that. Said FO commented how “I’m trying to be a good FO.”

Same FO going into SEA. Landing north. We get switched from the Hawkz7 arrival to the Olympia arrival from ATC due to weather. On that arrival, landing north, only restriction is Olympia at 13000 ft and 250 kts. After that, it’s a straight shot out on a radial for LACEE, ARVAD, and FOURT, with a heading 070 out of FOURT. Loaded 34L.

Briefing change STAR, FO leg, FO says box is wrong. This is because of after the Olympia restriction at 13,000, the FMC shows lower altitudes (in small letters) for the next 3 fixes. I comment that there’s no hard altitudes published for those fixes, so the FMC is calculating a path to make it down to 34L that is loaded with a discontinuity.

FO disagrees, says it should be 13,000 ft for all remaining fixes. I comment that’s not published. FO comments again that the box is wrong, and “it is not verified.”

So I go to plan mode on the ND, and show FO how close FOURT is to 34L, and comment how FO will be broken off way before FOURT for vectors to join, and that after Olympia, you’ll be using level change to get down anyway.

FO doesn’t buy it. Says we have to have the box match the plate. I look at the underlying airway, which shows 10,000 ft for the fixes after Olympia, and remark if that makes the FO more comfortable, put those in hard numbers, but that you’ll be high if you follow that, and you’re gonna get broken off anyway for vectors.

FO literally responds, so you’re happy with these wrong altitudes after Olympia?


At this point, if it wasn’t for a locked cockpit door for our work place, I would have expected a camera to come out from outside and the FO saying, you got PUNK’D!





Nope. Dead serious FO. The FO literally made a comment that we are ongoing with unverified altitude fixes after Olympia.

To try to alleviate concerns, I tell the FO you’re gonna be broken off on radar vectors and ATC will give you lower progressively, and you’ll have accurate VNAV once we clean up the box and extend the final leg course from HIPRO.


FO still isn’t happy. I explained again, all the FMC is trying to do is calculate a path after Olympia to “make it” for 34L, so of course it will have lower altitude values for LACEE, ARVAD, and FOURT.


FO still disagrees.

So of course we get broken off vectors after Olympia.

And then we reach a point FO is doing 215 knots, no flaps yet, and above glideslope (the glideslope diamond has gone below).

Hints at being high or drag are ignored. Same as Beefy’s case. This I find astounding. All this worrying about altitudes and fixes and now you’re high and not correcting.


When I was new on a jet, if anything I configured early and maybe got a debrief comment that it was a well done approach, but maybe coulda held off configuring early. And then I learned to ease up being early as more experience came. I got it nailed down to a nice science.




The fact there are new FOs who configure late, are left high and fast, and then DISMISS a CA comment that perhaps some drag might work, well I find that crazy.


I just don’t get it.
 
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When the only unique thing your company offers is a PDX base and some Guppies, you're not going to get the best and brightest.

It took an acquisition to move the needle and get an industry standard contract - for narrowbodies.
 
Another story, though I wasn’t there. A CA I know and respect said he had a sub 1 yr FO and that they were getting way high and FO not correcting. So after numerous ignored suggestions about drag, the CA said it reached a point where he had to reach over and get flaps 1, then 5 out. FO got pissed and yelled your controls! CA then took the landing.



Here’s the thing, on the line, you know that FO is gonna spread rumors this CA is a micromanager.
 
I guess I dont understand pilots that aren’t able to accept a more experienced pilot trying to help them out. Whether that be mentoring, or sharing techniques, or just trying to save you from making a dumb mistake. That’s kind of the cornerstone of professional aviation, regardless of what it is that you fly. I’m new, and I welcome it all. I fly with a lot of senior guys, and until now (PBS), I assume most of the great trips I got were folks that were on someone’s avoid list. Haven’t had a problem with any of them. Some are quirky, and don’t necessarily understand certain things about the automation, and want to fly in non-standard ways. Ways that I would remark are not dangerous, and are if anything overly conservative. Or just needlessly over complicating things. Those are the techniques that I will immediately s***tcan when we say bye at the end of the trip. But it is bizarre to imagine making those things into the figurative mountain I die on. Nothing unsafe, and nothing in violation of company procedure, AFM, or FOM. No harm, no foul, just sometimes a little weird and “never heard that one before” kinda stuff. People get way too bent out of shape, I guess when it comes to pride? I dunno
 
Another story, though I wasn’t there. A CA I know and respect said he had a sub 1 yr FO and that they were getting way high and FO not correcting. So after numerous ignored suggestions about drag, the CA said it reached a point where he had to reach over and get flaps 1, then 5 out. FO got pissed and yelled your controls! CA then took the landing.



Here’s the thing, on the line, you know that FO is gonna spread rumors this CA is a micromanager.
That's not new.

Ask any FedEx guy about a mediated debrief for "gesture bullying".
 
This problem also extends to the senior FO crowd who has skipped upgrade. I had one guy that was clearly high coming in. I asked him, want the gear? His answer was “not yet.” This, with us being 4,000 ft high.

He had to work his tail off to get down and barely made the stable gates.

At debrief, PF is supposed to ask the PM “how did that go?”

Instead, he initiates the debrief right off the bat and goes “yeah, I know, I was high and had to really work it.”

Um, yeah. Coulda been avoided right?



I don’t micromanage FOs. I just wish some of them would realize if I ask would you like the gear? The literal transition is “you needed the gear like 5 miles ago. You’re well late.”

I don’t speak until I feel like this probably will end up in a go around.


And in one recent case, with a January hire, second trip off OE, I lost sight of the big picture - and missed how close we were to the guy in front of us. Tower called our go around. Mentally, I was thinking, ok we are at 1500 ft, when is this guy gonna ask for the gear down? And was just about to say you need to configure.


I wonder if FOs realize that PM is an important job, but when you’re falling apart as PF, the PM’s task saturation increases, and can lead to diminished monitoring of other important things - like traffic.



I still feel a bit peeved at myself we ended up doing a tower instructed go around. Normally I always catch traffic ahead of us on the ND and slow down accordingly. I own my mistake, I shouldn’t have let the FO push us that tight into the corner. I should have spoken up sooner, and had we decelerated sooner, we would have had enough distance with the guy ahead.
 
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And I love to save fuel. But to those gear down at the last second bros, all it takes is ONE go around and you will burn 1,500 lbs for another lap at most major airports. That will kill 1+ yr of fuel savings you do from configuring at the last literal minute.
 
I have to say, to @BEEF SUPREME ’s point, I have seen a remarkable difference in newhires of late.

And not the good way.


At the gate, a new FO used the display switching panel to go from ‘norm’ to ‘both on right’ in order to send the Baro accel height from FO side to mine. I’ve never seen someone do that. Said FO commented how “I’m trying to be a good FO.”

The rest of your story is bizarre as hell. It would be hard not to lose it after three explanations. But the part above is some old school technique. I don’t think you were ever an FO on the guppy so maybe an old school CA never asked you for it. At my shop, setting the other altimeter that way is frowned upon but usually it’s probably being done by folks told to do it by senior CAs.
 
The rest of your story is bizarre as hell. It would be hard not to lose it after three explanations. But the part above is some old school technique. I don’t think you were ever an FO on the guppy so maybe an old school CA never asked you for it. At my shop, setting the other altimeter that way is frowned upon but usually it’s probably being done by folks told to do it by senior CAs.
I have seen several L-Alaska captains use that trick to pull the altimeter and accel height to their side.
 
Yeah it's a personality flaw. One that the interview process should weed out if that's something the company cares to filter.
Eh, I dunno. From things various folks involved in training and hiring at all the airlines recently have said it seems more part and parcel of the feeding frenzy the last couple years than anything specific to the virtual airline and real credit card company we fly for. And I say that as someone who has plenty of beef with the way things are in the training dept. Hopefully with hiring cooling we all get a little bit of seasoning and these issues get worked out.
 
I'm still new to being a 121 Captain so it's definitely been a learning experience for me as well. Coming from the corporate and small 135 side, you flew with a much smaller number of people and pretty much knew everyone in both seats outside of the occasional new hire that you quickly became familiar with.

Sharing the flying stuff is mostly the same. I'm super nerdy by nature so I always like to offer the "why" behind my suggestion. Like the other day with a brand new FO right off OE we get slowed down by center going into Sarasota. She opens the speed window and dials it in, which is great. The schoolhouse is emphasizing "top down" flying recently asking to make the changes effective immediately in the MCP first. Most people will then go to the FMS, update the speed on the CRZ and DES page, and close the speed window back, but she didn't. I'm sometimes even too relaxed about letting people do their thing, after all seeing the problem it causes first hand is the best way to learn, and in this case it doesn't really change anything so I make a mental note of it and let it be. We are then given a crossing restriction. She dials it in the altitude window, puts it in the LEGS page, and we get a new Top of Descent. As we keep trucking along towards T/D and seeing no intention of doing anything, this is when I mention that I recommended we start down now because that T/D is assuming a much steeper descent angle from our original descent speed in the FMS that we never updated. She seems confused but starts down, sees the banana bar land beyond our restriction at idle, gets the boards out and we make that restriction comfortably without floating people in the back. On the way down we talk about how the VNAV logic uses the parameters in the DES page to calculate a top of descent and vertical profile, and how when we deviate from that we either need to update it or be aware of our new required path and do something manually. I don't like suggesting one particular technique, but rather prefer to explain the implications of things and suggest various ways to handle it, even though some might be more elegant than others. I see the lightbulb moment and everything went smoothly for the rest of the flight. Overall she was great, just a bit green on the airplane as expected.

That kind of stuff I already had experience with, but this new environment brings some unexpected situations. Another FO I flew with had been here for 1 year and was well prepared but cocky. My line is pretty far out there but it still exists. It started when the lead FA comes up 15 minutes prior to departure to tell us there's a catering issue and they didn't load any of the preorder meals. As soon as she finishes the FO starts telling her that he's comfortable with leaving as long as everything else is onboard. I just let him keep going, staring at him with this look, and I think he caught the drift because he finished with "but I don't want to speak for the Captain". To which I replied "right.....let's look at the Gate Hold list and see if this is something we need to delay for". It mentioned that as long as there were enough First Class meals for all passengers, preorder meals were not guaranteed and it was not something to hold the flight for. Of course I made sure the FAs were comfortable with that because they would have to deal with the potentially upset customers, and after they said they were, we left. Sometimes a picture is worth a thousand words and I thought he got the message. Apparently not because on the next leg he jumps on the ACARS and messages crew tracking asking if they had any reroutes for him, hoping to make more money. He seemed genuinely surprised when I told him he shouldn't be doing that. So we had a talk about the importance of following the trip coverage sequence in the contract and how making side deals with the company not only hurts your fellow pilots who abide by the contract, but reduces our bargaining power collectively when it comes time for negotiations. He wasn't flying the line last summer when there was blatant abuse of skipping the trip coverage sequence by both scheduling and pilots making side deals, the issues that it caused, and the resolution to that which IMO was not in the pilots' favor. I also explained that it could get him in trouble with both ALPA, and his peers if he were to get caught. Hopefully he got the message this time. Both of those situations with him were unexpected to me because I've never had to provide mentoring on those items before in my previous Captain experience.

Hopefully I handled them properly and with a positive outcome, I'm still learning myself. The good thing is every trip I feel like I'm getting a little bit better and it's been an energizing feeling. It's making me want to go out and fly as many of my reserve days as possible and keep the improvement going. I'm sure I'll eventually get over it and go back to my old ways of trying to work as little as possible but for now I'm enjoying the journey.
 
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I have seen several L-Alaska captains use that trick to pull the altimeter and accel height to their side.




I figured this is what it is.


Same reason why I see many FOs run the EGPWS test and put the switch from NORM to ALT on the CA radio panel. It’s their way to “quiet” the flight deck a bit. I have no doubt they were “taught” this trick by some crusty CAs.
 
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